Rules for building statistical models : (preprint) by Hemelrijk, J.
stichting 
mathematisch 
centrum 
~ 
MC 
AFDELING MATHEMATISCHE STATISTIEK SW 53/78 APRIL 
(DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS) 
J • HEME LR I J K 
RULES FOR BUILDING STATISTICAL MODELS 
Preprint 
2e boerhaavestraat 49 amsterdam 
S\BL.lC>TH 
PILlnted at zhe Ma.thema.U.c.al Cen.tlr.e, 49, 2e BoeJtha.a.veA:tJuu:tt, Am.6.teit.dam. 
The Ma.thema.U.c.al Cen;tJr.e, 6ou.nded zhe 11-.th 06 Feb1tu.a1Ly 1946, .l6 a. non-
p1to6,l.t ,lru,,t,i;tu.U.on a,lm,lng at ,the pJtomoUon 06 pUILe mathema.U.CA a.nd w 
a.ppUcaUoru,. 1.t .l6 4pon601ted by ,the Ne.th<Vl1.a.n.d6 GoveJtnmen.t .th/tough .the 
Ne.th<Vl1.a.n.d6 01tga.n-lza.U.on 601t .the Adva.nc.emen.t 06 PU/Le ReAea.1tc.h (Z.W.O). 
AMS (MOS} subject cia$Sification scheme 0:970}: 60A05; . 62A99 
Rules for building statistical models*) 
by 
J. Hemelrijk 
SUMMARY 
One of the fundamental questions in statistical model building is when 
to use the same model for different situations or experiments. Axioms, how-
ever useful mathematically, say nothing about this. The author therefore 
proposes to introduce rules for the choice of a statistical model which 
have the character of instructions for use of the statistical toolkit. One 
of the basis rules proposed is the "principle of equivalence". Two repeat-
able experiments are called statistically equivalent if they cannot be dis-
tinguished from one another by means of sequences of outcomes of arbitrary 
length. This principle is elaborated and illustrated by means of an example. 
If experiments are (deemed to be) statistically equivalent the use of the 
same statistical model for all of them is justified. This principle is then 
used for the introduction of conditional probabilities and composite models, 
with symmetric probability spaces as models for randomizers as a starting-
point. 
KEY WORDS & PHRASES: foundations of statistics, statistical models, 
statistical equivalence 
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"Statistics uses the empirical hypothesis that apparatus ('lotteries') 
exist, admitting random choices of one among any given number of elements. 
Such apparatus do not exist in absolute perfection and their degree of 
perfection can only be defined after development of their theory. Their 
role is analogous to that of rigid bodies in euclidean geometry and of 
perfect clocks in dynamics. Empirical interpretation of probability state-
ments is only possible with reference to such random apparatus or to natu-
ral phenomena empirically found to behave statistically sufficiently like 
these". 
D. van Dantzig (1957) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of mathematical models is widespread and of an old date, 
but the general recognition of this fact is comparatively new. The question 
of how to choose a statistical mathematical model has led to considerable 
confusion and controversy, and still does. Mathematical statisticians wise-
ly save their skins by using the axiomatic approach, leaving the controver-
sy to others and the confusion to the users of their theory. For axioms, 
however useful, say nothing about their application. It seems to the author 
that the time has come to formulate rules for the choice .. of statistical 
models. In this paper a number of such rules are proposed. They will 
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certainly not please everybody, if only because they are formulated from 
the classical, objectivistic, point of view. They may, however, strengthen 
and clarify this point of view and help the user of statistical theory in 
its correct use and interpretation. 
The subject is an extensive one, which can only be touched upon in 
a short paper. Therefore many details have to be taken for granted, the 
history of the subject is left aside and the controversy between objectiv-
ists and subjectivists is ignored. 
In general a mathematical model is a simplification and an exacti-
fication of a part of reality. The simplification is necessary because of 
the extreme complexity of reality and the exactification because of its 
vagueness. Reality is always a bit out of focus: equality, for instance, 
is usually approximate equality and therefore not strictly transitive. In 
a mathematical model transitivity of equality and other desirable proper-
ties hold exactly and this makes it possible to develop extensive theories. 
But one ·should keep reality and model strictly apart. Confusing the two 
leads to baffling paradoxes - some of them well known - which can only be 
solved by disentangling reality and model. 
Statistical models are concerned with parts of reality which are 
subject to uncertainty and which we will call (statistical) experiments. 
The possible outcomes of a statistical experiment are usually known, but 
the actual results are in a higher or lesser degree unpredictable. Causal-
ity does not seem adequate for analysing such experiments; instead the prob-
abilistic approach is used. 
In the following sections rules for using this approach are formula-
ted step by step. These rules are not part of mathematics. They are not 
theorems nor are they laws of nature. They may be seen as directions for 
use of statistical models. They are certainly not perfect (nothing is) and 
their use cannot be enforced. But they are useful as a guide for sensible 
application of statistical methods. 
2. RANDOMIZERS 
Pure unpredictability in a statistical sense is found in a lottery, 
or randomizer. Everybody knows what a lottery is, but nevertheless it is 
suprisingly difficult to give a satisfactory description of its properties. 
A separate paper would be needed to this end. Let us just point out some 

4 
the probability of an event is equal to the ratio of the number of possible 
outcomes favorable for the event to the total number of possible outcomes. 
More precisely, if we call the activation of an N-randomizer: 
"drawing at random from O, ••. ,N-1", then the model for one random drawing 
consist of three elements: 
1) The space of (elementary) events: *) Q = {O, ... ,N-1}. 
2) Composite events: all subsets of Q. 
3) The Laplace-definition assigning a probability to every event: 
with N(Q') = the number of element of Q'. 
The basic threefold structure of this model holds for all statistical 
models, though usually in a more complicated form. It is also completely 
in harmony with the axiomatic set-up. We call this model a finite symmetric 
probability space and our first rule is: 
Rule 1. For one random drawing we use a finite symmetric probability 
space as mathematical model. 
Now consider a sequence of n random drawings, resulting in an n-vector 
of numbers from Q. According to property c) of section 2 this composite 
experiment is the same as one random drawing from the Nn possible n-vectors. 
Thus rule 1 also gives us the model for this sequence of drawings. If one 
works this out the result is the product probability space of n finite 
symmetric probability spaces, one for each of then random drawings. 
We omit the details; they are well-known to every statistician and we 
want to hurry on to more important points. But we do remark that the 
reasoning also holds for a sequence of random drawings from different 
randomizers and that we arrive thus at our second rule: 
Rule 2. For a sequence of n random drawings we use as a model the product 
probability space of then symmetric probability spaces of the 
separate drawings. 
Remark that the term "independent" need not yet be introduced at this stage; 
it is implicit in property b) and emerges explicitly in a natural way when 
later on conditional probabilities are introduced. At the present stage one 
"(possible) result", "(possible) outcome" and "elementary event" are 
used as synomyms. 
might say that a randomizer is independent of everything: it walks, 
like a cat, by itself. 
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE 
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The transition from rule 1 to rule 2 has been accomplished by 
stating that - according to property b) - n random drawings from 0, ... ,N-1 
n 
"are the same as" one random drawing from O, ... ,N -1 (after numbering the 
n-vectors in an arbitrary order). This expression "the same as" is not very 
accurate; the two experiments compared are not the same, but they both have 
the properties of a randomizer. In a certain sense they are equivalent with 
respect to their statistical properties. It is worth while to elaborate on 
this point because it leads us to one of the key-points of our set-up. 
Consider two repeatable experiments E' and E" with the same possible 
outcomes W' = Q") but otherwise possibly very different. Let the follow-
ing information be supplied: 
1) an accurate description of E'and E", 
2) two sequences of results A and B from these experiments, however with-
out identification; this means that it is not known whether A and E' 
(and B and E") belong together or the other way around. 
Additional information is supplied on request: 
3) further details about E' and E", 
4) extensions of the sequences A and B (again without identification), 
5) sequences C' from E' and C" from E". 
If in this situation there is no conceivable method of identifying the 
sequences A and B, then E' and E" are called (statistically) equivalent. 
Their statistical behaviour with respect to the possible outcomes consi-
dered, is the same. The generalization to more than two experiments is 
straightforward and we can now formulate: 
The principle of equivalence. If experiments are equivalent in the sense 
described above, then the use of the same model for all of them is justi-
fied. 
External reasons like practical importance and cost of time and money may 
lead to the use of different models when, statistically speaking, the use 
of the same model would be desirable. In this paper, however, we will 
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strictly adhere to the principle of using the same model for equivalent 
experiments. 
A lot more can be said about the concept of equivalence, but a 
practical example may at this point be more clarifying. Five experiments 
have, to this, end, each been excecuted 221 times. They are 
*) E 1: recording the last digit of the hodometer 6f the authors car when . 
he left the car for more than half an hour. 
E2 : recording at the same moments, the last digit of the sub-hodometer, 
which records the same distance in units of 100 m (mod 10 000). 
E 3 : recording the last digit of the hodometers of cars in public parking 
lots. 
E4 : throwing a blue tensided die carrying the numbers 0, ... ,9. 
ES: throwing a red tensided die with the same numbers. 
For every experiment the results of 221 excecutions were recorded in the 
order of their observation. The dice were well made and they were thrown in 
such a way that E4 and ES may be considered to be 10-randomizers. For these 
two experiments equivalence is clear: from property b) of section 2 it 
follows that all N-randomizers are equivalent (for any fixed N). It is not 
very plausible that E1 and E2 are equivalent to E4 and ES, but E3 might 
well be. For although E3 is much more complicated then E4 and ES it is 
difficult to imagine why it would be possible to find two systems of pre-
dicting the next outcome of E3 ohe of which is better than the other. This 
might well be possible for E1 and E2 • 
It is clear that speculations of this kind are not a sufficient basis 
for deciding about equivalence. The observations themselves, however, may 
help. And one of the tasks of statistical theory is to provide methods to 
test equivalence of experiments and the goodness of fit of models to experi-
ments. These methods are indeed available and one of them can be used in 
our case. In order to confuse the reader the five sequences have been 
assigned labels A, B, C, D, Eat random. Table 1 contains the observations 
in their original form. It is difficult to draw any conclusions directly 
from these date. They have been completely recorded in Table 1 in order 
to enable the reader to play around with them himself. A first step in 
getting a better survey of the data is to arrange them in a frequency table. 
·*) The hodometer aumulatively counts the distance covered by the car in km 
(mod 100 000). 
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This has been done in table 2, where two columns have been added, one for 
h 11 k . t· 2 d t ewe - nown test statis ic X an one for the right-hand tail-probability 
P. Extreme values of P indicate deviations from randomness; the number of 
degrees of freedom is 9, the hypothesis tested: randomness. 
Table 1. Five sequences of observations 
9 0 4 9 3 3 6 1 8 7 7 5 9 5 3 8 1 8 5 3 9 9 7 9 2 3 5 2 7 0 0 6 
4 6 5 5 1 9 4 5 4 7 0 4 2 5 1 7 8 5 6 3 1 4 6 1 3 3 4 7 3 1 9 3 
8 9 8 0 6 0 6 5 6 6 4 3 9 0 0 3 8 9 9 0 8 5 3 4 2 5 5 4 7 2 5 2 
0 8 7 3 7 0 6 9 6 4 9 1 3 2 3 9 7 0 3 2 6 6 2 8 9 6 8 8 :2 8 1 0 
A 8 5 3 3 8 8 0 5 7 7 2 4 7 1 0 6 6 0 5 5 6 6 4 4 9 9 0 7 8 3 7 4 
5 2 ') ..) 1 3 7 9 4 9 8 4 0 4 6 4 1 3 7 9 3 3 0 8 4 3 8 7 4 4 4 7 9 
3 8 8 7 9 1 2 7 4 6 1 8 2 7 7 8 8 7 8 3 3 4 7 8 9 3 2 2 ., l 
7 1 2 8 8 1 8 9 5 4 0 6 0 0 0 1 1 6 7 4 7 5 2 8 3 1 3 5 4 6 7 7 
2 9 4 9 9 9 1 2 4 7 3 1 6 4 9 7 6 3 8 8 3 6 8 9 6 9 5 9 3 8 5 1 
7 9 1 7 3 6 8 1 8 8 2 1 3 0 2 3 0 4 5 0 7 8 0 5 2 9 3 4 3 4 5 1 
B 8 6 1 3 8 5 3 2 0 1 3 9 6 7 9 2 4 6 4 0 4 6 3 9 5 7 8 4 1 6 1 2 
2 7 3 9 4 2 6 5 1 9 6 2 8 7 2 8 6 4 5 5 0 7 0 0 4 9 5 1 5 8 7 9 
4 8 3 9 3 2 3 2 6 6 8 5 1 5 2 9 8 2 7 7 5 2 0 2 0 6 1 9 5 1 7 4 
0 1 7 4 4 2 1 4 0 6 3 6 0 9 8 2 2 5 1 1 8 5 1 6 0 8 7 9 8 
4 5 7 9 0 2 7 3 7 3 0 1 1 0 9 5 5 4 0 9 2 3 4 1 9 8 8 8 6 0 6 3 
5 0 6 3 6 4 3 0 9 6 4 0 1 6 1 5 0 2 3 8 9 7 6 8 7 8 9 6 2 6 0 2 
5 5 8 8 3 9 3 2 2 0 5 2 1 2 7 1 0 1 7 8 9 2 0 1 3 8 2 1 1 3 6 1 
C 5 0 4 4 8 3 5 6 7 5 5 9 8 5 7 7 2 3 8 8 1 7 8 0 0 0 0 7 8 4 9 9 
9 5 0 1 6 7 1 5 8 2 9 2 3 6 4 9 6 5 5 5 9 1 9 2 6 5 6 1 7 9 7 3 
0 4 0 8 2 4 3 2 3 5 7 0 7 0 7 8 3 0 6 7 2 7 1 9 4 9 9 9 9 4 1 9 
7 6 9 2 1 5 8 3 7 1 0 2 0 6 6 4 1 2 1 0 0 9 0 6 2 7 1 5 1 
5 6 6 0 8 2 6 5 3 9 2 6 5 5 4 5 4 8 2 9 5 6 7 7 2 9 9 8 7 3 0 3 
5 9 2 9 3 2 2 4 1 5 9 6 2 8 5 1 1 4 7 9 3 3 4 6 4 8 4 7 4 0 4 8 
1 5 0 3 7 7 3 1 4 3 6 5 9 3 2 3 9 8 4 8 1 1 4 3 9 2 3 4 3 9 5 9 
2 9 6 4 5 9 5 7 3 8 3 6 0 6 2 3 4 5 4 1 6 0 4 7 1 7 3 7 1 2 4 4 
D 4 7 1 5 0 1 3 2 5 9 1 7 0 4 8 7 9 8 3 3 7 0 2 8 7 6 5 9 2 5 1 0 
1 9 3 6 5 6 8 8 4 9 2 8 1 9 3 6 5 1 4 2 6 0 3 3 2 7 7 0 4 8 1 5 
2 2 5 9 8 2 4 6 1 0 4 7 5 7 5 3 3 7 1 0 5 9 3 6 9 9 8 7 6 
7 3 9 5 9 5 1 3 4 7 0 0 0 9 5 1 9 6 5 9 0 1 9 6 9 4 4 1 6 3 7 0 
0 4 9 0 7 8 6 7 3 3 1 0 8 7 3 2 5 i 9 7 9 1 0 4 7 9 6 2 1 4 2 2' 
2 9 9 3 5 9 6 2 1 8 1 0 1 9 4 1 0 3 7 6 3 4 3 1 8 8 9 8 8 8 0 5 
1 6 5 1 3 8 0 5 8 6 8 2 5 7 6 5 8 2 9 3 0 9 7 5 5 9 3 1 9 4 2 4 
E 4 3 5 5 3 8 9 7 0 1 4 6 2 5 3 4 7 0 1 0 5 9 4 4 4 6 3 0 0 9 4 9 
1 3 6 4 8 4 5 8 2 2 3 5 8 8 2 6 8 3 5 9 7 3 8 4 7 0 3 4 7 9 2 3 
7 3 3 8 8 7 9 9 2 5 4 1 9 2 1 4 9 2 1 6 0 3 4 6 6 5 3 4 0 
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Table 2. Frequencies of 0, .•. ,9 in the five sequences 
0 1 2 3 4 I 5 6 ! 7 I 8 9 I p I X I 2 
I I 
A 19 14 16 30 25 ' 19 20 27 27 24 11.26 0.26 
I 
B 19 26 23 20 21 I 21 ! 22 21 25 23 1.94 0.992 I I 
' 
' C 29 25 22 ' 19 14 22 21 23 20 26 6.92 0.65 
D 14 20 22 28 26 26 20 I 22 18 i 25 7.46 0.59 
22 22 17 27 25 22 j 17 18 I I E 21 1 30 7.46 0.59 I 
None of the frequencies in table 2 deviates extremely from its mean 22.1. 
None of the values Pis very small. One, however, pertaining to sequence 
B, is very close to 1, indicating some source of regularity which cannot 
be expected in a randomizer. Thus B may well stem from E1 or E2 . But the 
result is still very undecisive. Therefore we go one more step in our 
analysis, aiming straightly at a point where E 1 and E2 may well be very 
different from E3 , E4 and E5 . For every pair of consecutive results, x 1 
and x 2 say, we form the difference x 2-x 1 (mod 10). ThLs gives us five new 
sequences of 220 results each. We need not give a table of these in the 
form of table 1, because the reader can easily write this down himself. 
The new sequence A would start with: 1 4 5 4 0 ... This operation applied 
to successive results of a 10-randomizer gives again a 10-randomizer. This 
can easily be proved by means of the model implied by rules 1 and 2. It 
can also be viewed as a property like c) and d) of section 2; the reader 
can easily verify this by some thinking. On the other hand it is very 
plausible that this does not hold at all for E 1 and E2 because the author 
often travels the distance from home to work by car. 
Table 3. Frequencies of 0, ... ,9 in differencies-ruod 10 
! 3 I I 0 1 2 4 i 5 6 I 7 8 9 x2 p 
A 28 26 22 21 18 I 24 20 29 24 18 4.82 0.89 
B 17 20 I 23 12 19 28 ! 37 28 I 18 18 21. 27 0.012 
[ 29 I I 22 C 24 18 I 16 25 28 18 16 24 9.36 0.40 
' 
I 
-9 D 18 15 14 ' 35 49 10 26 11 11 31 68.64 2.6x10 I ! 
E 23 19 22 j 31 I 22 20 19 16 I 23 25 6.82 0.66 I 
I I i i I 
' 
The frequencies of the five new series are given in table 3. Now the 
situation is completely changed. In D the differences 3 and 4 are very 
predominant and in B the same holds, but less strongly, for 5, 6 and 7. 
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The value of Pis very small for D and small for B; there is little doubt 
that D and B stem from E1 and E2 , possibly even in this order. Additional 
information of the types 4) and 5) mentioned above would most probably lead 
to a decision in this question. Thus our conclusion is that E4 , E5 and E6 
may well be considered equivalent, but E1 and E2 certainly are not equiva-
lent, neither to each other nor to the other three. If the reader would 
wish to try to identify E3 among A, C and E, he can provide additional 
observations of E3 himself. 
Anticipating an objection to the principle of equivalence we may 
concede that it will never be possible to prove conclusively that two exper-
iments are equivalent. But then, absolute certainly about such things is 
not part of this life. If experiments are deemed equivalent for suffi-
ciently sensible reasons and if observations in sufficient numbers do not 
contradict this, then the principle can be used. For on the other hand non-
equivalence can be proved experimentally to a reasonable degree of certain-
ty, as the example illustrates. 
5. PROBABILITY SPACES WITH UNEQUAL PROBABILITIES 
To arrive at probability spaces with unequal probabilities for the 
elementary events, the space of events~ of a symmetric probability space 
is partitioned into a set of non-overlapping subsets. These, together with 
their probabilities form a new probability space. The addition law .for 
exclusive even.ts, which in the symmetric probability space follows from 
the Laplace-definition, is carried over to the new probability space and 
this leads us to finite discrete probability spaces. The principle of equi-
valence then justifies the use of such a space as a model for experiments 
where a lack of symmetry does not suggest the use of equal probabilities 
at all. A simple example: let experiment E' be throwing a loaded six-sided 
die, E" using an N-randomizer with sufficiently big N with r2 = { O, ••. ,N-1} 
partitioned into six subsets with unequal numbers of elements n 1 , ... ,n6 , 
carrying the numbers 1, ... ,6. The contention is that for suitably chosen 
N and n 1 , ... ,n6 the two experiments are equivalent, thus justifying the 
use of a discrete probability field for E'. Of course a suitable choice 
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of n 1 , ••• ,n6 (and N) would have to depend on observations of E' but that 
only emphasizes the need of testing the goodness of fit of a model which 
has been chosen on the basis of rules and practical considerations. We 
thus arrive at: 
Rule 3. If an experiment is equivalent to a suitably chosen partitioned 
randomizer then we use a discrete probability space as mathemati-
cal model. 
6. STATISTICAL INDEPENDENCE 
At the end of section 3 it was remarked that the independence of 
successive uses of randomizers is implicit in the properties of a randomizer. 
It is expressed in property b) by means of the fact that the past does not 
help to predict the future. This concept must be generalized and more for-
mally expressed: 
DEFINITION. Consider n experiments E1 , •.• ,En' each of which separately 
is adequately described by a completely specified probability space; if 
knowledge of the results of any part of these experiments (after they have 
been performed) does not influence the predictability of the results of 
any of the others, then the experiments are called statistically indepen-
dent. 
This, again, is a practical concept of considerable vagueness, which needs 
exactification by means of a mathematical model. It is clear from the defi-
nition and the previously formulated rules that the whole sequence (E 1, ••• ,En) 
is equivalent ton random drawings from suitably chosen partitioned random-
izers and thus rule 2 indicates the use of the product-space: 
Rule 4. If n statistically independent experiments are each described by 
a probability space the combined experiment (E1 , ••• ,En) is des-
cribed by the product of these probability spaces. 
Omitting, in this rule, the term "completely specified", which figures in 
the above definition, only means a slight generalization. The term cannot 
be omitted from the definition: if there are unknown parameters involved 
previous experiments -- independent or not - may supply information about 
these parameters and thus influence the predictability of the other expe-
riments. This would for instance occur in a sequence of throws of the 
11 
loaded die used as an example in section 5, where nevertheless successive 
throws would be independent. 
7. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AND COMPOSITE MODELS 
From independence. to dependence is only one step but a very important 
one. An example of statistical dependence is found in repetitions of E 1 of 
section 4; line D of table 3 (which does in fact pertain to E 1 ) clearly indi-
cates that adding 4 to the previous result (mod 10) is certainly·· superior 
as a method of prediction to adding 5. To build models for dependent expe-
riments we need conditional probabilities. 
Usually conditional probabilities are introduced in the model by 
means of a definition. Let ri 1 and ri2 be subsets of the space of events SJ 
then the conditional probability of finding an element of n2 under the con-
dition that an element of ri 1 occurs is 
where P(SJ 1 ) must be positive. This definition in itself says nothing about 
the way it should be used in applications. We therefore present a justifi-
cation of (2) based on our rules, which also leads to a new rule giving 
insight in the way it should be used for model-building. 
Consider the following two experiments. 
E': drawing one element at random from n1 (using an N(SJ 1 )-randomizer for 
the purpose), 
E": drawing elements at random from Q (by means of an NW) -randomizer) 
until for the first time an element from n1 is obtained and considering 
this element as the outcome of the composite experiment. 
According to property d) of section 2 E' and E" are equivalent and thus we 
ought to use the same model for both of them. But according to rule 1 the 
model for E' is a symmetric probability space with ri 1 as space of events 
and with the Laplace-definition. This means that we should also use this 
model for E" and this is exactly what happens. The notation "ISJ 1 11 is used 
to indicate the conditioning on ri 1 in either of the two ways indicated by 
E' or E". The Laplace-definition applied to E' now leads straight to (2), 
for according to this definition we have 
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where the unconditional probabilities pertain to one random drawing from 
Q. Note that neither E' nor E" can be performed if NW 1 ) = O; thus the 
reasoning only holds if P(s-2 1 ) > 0. 
The equivalence of E' and E" seems rather evident but the following 
*) 
anecdote shows that this does not hold for everybody • An advertising 
agency organized a quiz in order to promote some product. The quiz consisted 
of some simple questions and the response was overwhelming. Thousands of 
answers were received and, of course, the prizes had to be awarded at random 
among the correct solutions. To this end the agency hired a number of work-
ing students in order to sift out the wrong answers (which were comparati-
vely few). This took several weeks time and when this work was completed 
the winners were drawn at random from the correct solutions. This procedure 
corresponds to E' and it is perfectly correct. How much more simple and less 
time-consuming it would have been, however, to use procedure E"! 
The generalization of (2) to partitioned probability spaces is 
straightforward. We will skip it. It is also clear that from (2) the gener-
al multiplication law and the theorem on composite probabilities follow 
and that statistical independence means that conditional probabilities are 
equal to the corresponding unconditional ones. 
After these preparations we want to formally introduce the use of 
conditional 
Let E(l) be 
probabilities in building up models for stepwise experiments. 
an experiment with Q(l) as its space of events and P(l) as its 
probability function on Q(l), all according to previous rules. Let E( 2 ) be 
( 2) 
a second experiment with space of events Q , but depending on the result 
(1) (1) (1) . (2) 
of E in the following sense: for every w E Q an experiment E (1) 
(2) (2) 'w 
is given which has a probability function P (l) (on Q ), depending on 
w(l), again in accordance with previous rule~. The composite experiment 
(1) (2) . (1) (2) (1) . 
E = (E ,E ) is composed of E and E w(l), where w is the event 
realized in E(l). In these circumtances E(2) is called statistically depen-
dent on E(l) and Eis called a stepwise composed experiment. By induction 
*) H. Piller, personal communication. 
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we get any finite number of steps. 
The model for E must be in accordance with previous model-rules and 
to find such a model we again consider two equivalent experiments: 
E': one realisation of E( 2 ~1) for given w(l); the probability for obtaining 
w(2 ) E n< 2 > is then w 
P (~ )(1) (w (2) ) • 
E ll • ·1 (1)' (l) dl k" h <2 > : repeating E unti E gives w an oo ing at t e result of E in 
h . 1 h" . ' h . ' (1) ., tat tria. Tis means:imposing t e condition w on E, and thus the 
model for E must be such that the probability for obtaining w( 2) E n< 2 > is 
P(w (2) lw (1)). 
The equivalence of E' and E" now leads to 
(3) p(2) (w(2)) 
w(l) 
and together with the multiplication law, which must also hold in the model 
. (1) (2) for E, we find that we have to build up this model on n x n by means 
of 
This is the only possibility if we want to obey our previous rules and the 
principle of equivalence. This result can be summarized as follows. 
Rule 5. For stepwise experiments where for every step previous rules lead 
to a probability space depending on the results of previous steps, 
a model is built up by means of conditional probability spaces for 
the steps and by means of the multiplication law for simultaneous 
probabilities. 
8. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AND INFORMATION 
Although some details were glossed over in section 7 the treatment of 
a seemingly obvious method may seem rather extensive to some readers. But 
one must be careful as the following example is meant to show. A player 
throws a good six-sided die and you are to guess the result. This is the 
situation of section 2: your guess does not really matter as long as it is 
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Lack of knowledge about the information-policy can be incorporated 
adequately in the model by introducing an unknown partitioning of Q, i.e. 
unknown conditions for the conditional probabilities. In our example with 
the die this would, in case "it is not 6 11 , lead to five possible outcomes 
with unknown probabilities, which can have only a finite number of different 
values because there are only a finite number of possible partitionings. 
Further knowledge about.the actual values but also about the actual infor-
mation-policy could then be gathered by observing repeated independent 
trials of the same experiment. On the other hand it may be remarked that 
one may remedy the situation by randomizing ones guess among the numbers 
1, ••• ,5. Then at least the probability of a right guess is 1/5. Thus per-
haps, one should never read a newspaper without a die or a coin at hand. 
9. FINAL REMARKS 
Although up till this point we only have finitely many rational 
probabilities in a probability space the generalization to infinitely many 
real ones and to continuous probability spaces is of a less fundamental 
nature. It is all passing to the limit and approximating discrete situa-
tions by means of continuous ones for the sake of mathematical convenience 
and greater generality. So we need not be sorry that the scope of this paper 
does not allow us to go over all that. It is a pity that the space allotted 
is too small to talk about some other things like: the interpretation of 
probabilities in order to go back from the model to reality after the anal-
ysis in the model. is completed and to the phenomenon that statisticians 
do not only seek to predict the future, but also the past: the example in 
section 7 is of that character just as e.g. the method of confidence inter-
vals for unknown parameters. These things are interesting but they will 
have to wait. 
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